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  1 1  Introduction 
Financial intermediation costs and contract enforcement vary considerably across countries and 
with the level of economic development. For example, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Leaven and Levine (2004) 
document that the net interest margin, which reﬂects explicit and implicit ﬁnancial sector taxes 
(e.g., taxes on ﬁnancial transactions, intermediary proﬁts or inﬂation) and bank regulation (e.g., 
barriers to entry and non-interest-bearing reserve requirements), is over 10% in Belarus, Burundi 
and Ghana,  but less than 2% in the Netherlands and Switzerland.1  Similarly,  data from The 
World Bank (2005a) shows that collateral and bankruptcy laws vary considerably across countries, 
as does the quality of the judicial system in which the laws are enforced.  Seminal research by 
La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) shows that institutions that aﬀect contract 
enforcement are correlated with the level of economic development (see ﬁgure 2).  We study the 
quantitative eﬀects of these ﬁnancial frictions on three measures of macroeconomic development: 
output per capita, total credit and income inequality. 
We construct a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and two ﬁnancial fric­
tions  –  limited  enforcement  and  intermediation  costs.  Agents  choose  to  be  either  workers  or 
entrepreneurs, as in the Lucas (1978) “span of control” model.  We make a key modiﬁcation by 
assuming that ﬁrms use capital in addition to labor;  see Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007).  Het­
erogeneous ability is exogenous,  in the sense that the ability to manage a ﬁrm productively is 
drawn from a ﬁxed distribution and is independent within and across generations. Agents choose 
consumption and capital bequests to maximize preferences subject to lifetime wealth.  Bequests 
thus connect generations across time and the bequest distribution evolves endogenously. We study 
two capital market frictions:  a deadweight cost to intermediate loans and an incentive constraint 
to ensure loan repayment.  The capital of each entrepreneur depends on the proﬁtability of the 
project and the entrepreneur’s net worth.  Thus, the most able individuals will not necessarily 
become entrepreneurs or operate ﬁrms of the unconstrained optimal size.  Rather, occupational 
choice and ﬁrm size are determined endogenously by an agent’s type (ability and bequest) and the 
credit market frictions.2 
We calibrate the model economy so that the long run equilibrium matches key statistics of 
the United States economy. We then explore how the equilibrium properties of the model change 
with variations in the two policy variables, intermediation costs and the level of contract enforce­
ment.  First, we consider benchmark changes in the policy parameters.  Next, we use independent 
estimates of intermediation costs and contract enforcement for Brazil, France, Russia and Singa­
pore, keeping the other parameters at the U.S. level.  Through this counterfactual exercise, we 
evaluate what U.S. output per capita and credit would be if ﬁnancial contract enforcement and 
intermediation costs were the same as in, for instance, Brazil. 
The eﬀects of these ﬁnancial market imperfections depend on two opposing forces:  a demand 
eﬀect and a general equilibrium eﬀect. When intermediation costs increase or enforcement weakens, 
the demand for loans by entrepreneurs decreases for a given interest rate. This is the demand eﬀect. 
When the interest rate is exogenous, this is the only eﬀect in the loan market. Consequently, less 
productive and smaller ﬁrms operate because a larger number of these ﬁrms is required to clear the 
labor market.  When the interest rate is endogenous, a fall in the demand for loans decreases the 
1The net interest margin is a measure of the wedge between borrowing and lending rates. See ﬁgure 2. 
2Antunes, Cavalcanti and Villamil (2007) prove the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium that is fully 
characterized by a time invariant bequest distribution and associated equilibrium factor prices.  From any initial 
bequest distribution and any interest rate, convergence to this unique invariant bequest distribution occurs.  They 
also describe a direct, non-parametric approach to compute the stationary solution. 
2 interest rate.  A lower interest rate implies higher capital, productivity, and ﬁrm size.  This is the 
general equilibrium eﬀect, and the overall eﬀect of a change depends on the two opposing forces. 
Our simulations show that the quantitative eﬀect of ﬁnancial reform depends critically on the 
interest rate.  For instance, when ﬁnancial contract enforcement and intermediation costs change 
from the U.S. to the Brazilian level, output per capita decreases by roughly 43 percentage points 
when the interest rate is ﬁxed (this is about half of the diﬀerence in output per capita between Brazil 
and the United States),3  but by only 6.3 percentage points when the interest rate is determined 
endogenously. The general equilibrium factor price eﬀect is quantitatively signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of 
ﬁnancial reform on entrepreneurs’ income inequality is also striking. When the interest rate is ﬁxed, 
ﬁnancial reform decreases borrowing costs. Fewer but more able managers become entrepreneurs, 
and this is more eﬃcient.  Inequality increases because more able managers operate ﬁrms.  When 
the interest rate is endogenous it increases after an identical ﬁnancial market reform. This oﬀsets 
the loan demand eﬀect, especially for able but capital constrained entrepreneurs at the upper tail 
of the entrepreneurial income distribution.  Finally, we check the robustness of our results by as­
suming that a signiﬁcant fraction of output is produced by non-ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, which 
form a ‘corporate sector’ (see Quadrini, 2000). Interestingly, adding this unconstrained sector aug­
ments the capital market distortions because the frictions increase the amount of capital used by 
this sector, but not necessarily more productively than by some credit constrained entrepreneurs. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the model.  Section 3 considers the oc­
cupational choice problem.  Section 4 describes the model calibration.  Section 5 contains policy 
experiments designed to evaluate the eﬀects of benchmark changes in the two ﬁnancial frictions. 
Section 6 performs counterfactual experiments for selected countries. Section 7 analyzes the econ­
omy with a ﬁnancially unconstrained corporate sector and compares it with the baseline model. 
Finally, section 8 concludes. 
2  The model 
Consider an economy with a continuum of measure one individuals.  Each individual lives for one 
period and reproduces another such that population is constant.  Time is discrete and inﬁnite 
(t = 0, 1, 2, ...).  There is one good that can be used for consumption or production, or left to the 
next generation as a bequest. 
2.1  Preferences, endowments and technology 
Preferences:  Agents care about their own consumption and leave a bequest to their oﬀspring. 
Let ct
i  and zt
i 
+1  denote consumption and bequests, respectively, by agent i in period t, with 
U






1−γ , γ ∈ (0, 1).  (1) 
The utility function implies that agents are risk-neutral with respect to income as the indirect 
utility function is linear in wealth. This implies that any additive punishment or reward in utility 
may be measured in terms of income.  For tractability, we assume that preferences are for the 
bequest and not the oﬀspring’s utility.4 
3Interestingly, intermediation costs and contract enforcement can explain most of the diﬀerence in output per 
capita and total private credit as a share of output between France and the United States. 
4For a similar formulation, see Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000). 
3 Endowments:  Each  agent  is  endowed  with  an  initial  wealth,  bt,  inherited  from  the  previous 
generation.  An individual can be either a worker or an entrepreneur.  Entrepreneurs create jobs 
and manage their labor force, n. As in Lucas (1978), each individual is endowed with a talent for 
managing, xi, drawn from a continuous cumulative probability distribution function Γ(x) where 
x ∈ [0, 1].  Thus, in each period agents are distinguished by their initial bequest and ability as 
entrepreneurs, (bt
i,xt
i). We assume that an agent’s talent for managing is not hereditary and (bt
i,xt
i) 
is public information. In the remainder of the paper we drop agent superscript i. 
Production sector: Managers operate a technology that uses labor, n, and capital, k, to produce 
a single consumption good, y, that is represented by 
y = xk
α n 
β ,  α,  β  > 0,  and  α + β < 1.	 (2) 
Capital fully depreciates between periods. Managers can operate only one project. 
The capital market: Agents have two options in which to invest their initial wealth: 
•	 Financial Intermediaries:  Agents can competitively rent capital to ﬁnancial intermediaries 
(banks) and earn an endogenously determined interest rate, r. 
•	 Private Equity:  Agents can use their own capital as part of the amount required to start a 
business. They borrow the remaining capital they require from a bank at interest rate rB. 
Competition among banks implies that the eﬀective interest rate on borrowing is rB  =  r + τ, 
where τ  reﬂects transaction costs such as explicit and implicit ﬁnancial sector taxes (e.g., taxes 
on ﬁnancial transactions, bank proﬁts or inﬂation), or bank regulations (e.g., reserve and liquidity 
requirements). For expositional and computational purposes, we use the equivalent setting where 
all agents deposit their initial wealth in a bank and earn return r. The banks lend these resources 
to entrepreneurs, who use their initial wealth as collateral for the loan.  The interest rate on the 
part of the loan that is fully collateralized is r, while the rate on the remainder is rB. 
We assume that borrowers cannot commit ex-ante to repay.  Those that default on their debt 
incur a cost equal to percentage φ of output net of wages. This is equivalent to an additive utility 
punishment. This penalty reﬂects the strength of contract enforcement in the economy.5 
3  Optimal behavior and equilibrium 
3.1  Entrepreneurs 
Agents who have suﬃcient resources and managerial ability to become entrepreneurs choose the 
level of capital and the number of employees to maximize proﬁt subject to a technological con­
straint and (possibly) a credit market incentive constraint. Let us ﬁrst consider the problem of an 
entrepreneur for a given level of capital k and wages w: 
π(k, x; w) = max xk
α n 
β − wn,	 (3) 
n 




n(k, x; w) =  .	 (4) 
w 
5A proportional punishment is standard. See Krasa and Villamil (2000) and Krasa, Sharma and Villamil (2007). 
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1−β π(k, x; w) = (1 − β)(xk
α)  .  (5) 
w 
Let a be the amount of self-ﬁnanced capital (or, equivalently, the part of the loan that is fully 
collateralized by the agent’s personal assets), and l be the amount of funds borrowed from a bank 
(or, equivalently, the amount of the loan that is not collateralized). 
Unconstrained Problem.  When initial wealth is suﬃcient for the agent to start her own business 
without resorting to credit ﬁnance (i.e., b > a and l = 0), entrepreneurs solve the problem 
max π(k, x; w) − (1 + r)k.  (6) 
k≥0 
This gives the optimal physical capital level: 




�1−β �  1 
k
∗(x; w, r) =  x .  (7) 
w  1 + r 
There is no credit market incentive constraint because when the ﬁrm is entirely self-ﬁnanced, no 
repayment problem exists. 
Constrained Problem.  Now consider the case where the entrepreneur’s initial wealth may not be 
suﬃcient to ﬁnance the ﬁrm (i.e., b ≤ a and l ≥ 0); the entrepreneur may wish to obtain loans from 
the credit market. Since agents cannot commit to repay, loan contracts must be self-enforcing. 
The entrepreneur now maximizes the net income from running the project 
V (b, x; w, r) =  max 
a≥0,  l≥0 
π(a + l, x; w) − (1 + r)a − (1 + r + τ)l  (8) 
subject to the credit market incentive constraint and feasibility 
φπ(a + l, x; w) ≥ (1 + r + τ )l  (9) 
b ≥ a.  (10) 
Incentive compatibility constraint (9) guarantees that ex-ante  repayment promises are honored 
(the percentage of proﬁts the ﬁnancial intermediary seizes in default is at least as high as the 
repayment obligation). See Kehoe and Levine (1993). We can rewrite this constraint as 
φ 
l(b, x; w, r) ≤  π(k(b, x; w, r),x; w). 
1 + r + τ 
The policy parameters aﬀect loan size:  Penalty φ has a direct eﬀect; better enforcement (φ  1) 
increases loan size.6  Intermediation cost τ has an indirect eﬀect via the interest rate wedge. 
→ 
Feasibility constraint (10) states that the amount of self ﬁnance, a, cannot exceed bequest, b. 
The constrained problem yields optimal policy functions a(b, x; w, r) and l(b, x; w, r) that deﬁne 
the size of each ﬁrm, 
k(b, x; w, r) = a(b, x; w, r) + l(b, x; w, r). 
There are four types of solutions to the entrepreneur’s problem: 
6See Quintin (2001) and Guner, Ventura and Yi (2004) for the eﬀect of policies on ﬁrm size distributions. 
5 Case 1.  No constraint binds. The entrepreneur self-ﬁnances and does not borrow (b > a > 0, l = 0). 
Case 2.  (10)  binds  (a  =  b >  0),  (9)  does  not,  but  l  =  0.  The  entrepreneur  uses  all  wealth  to 
self-ﬁnance and does not borrow. 
Case 3.  (10)  binds  (a  =  b >  0),  (9)  does  not,  and  l >  0.  The  entrepreneur  uses  all  wealth  to 
self-ﬁnance and borrows additional funds from the bank. 
Case 4.  Both constraints bind. The entrepreneur uses all wealth to self-ﬁnance (a = b) and borrows 
(l > 0) from the bank, but is credit constrained, φπ(a + l, x; w) = (1 + r + τ )l. 
Entrepreneurs invest their entire wealth in their ﬁrm as long as b ≤ k∗(x; w, r).  This follows 
immediately from the fact that the cost of self-ﬁnance is lower than using a ﬁnancial intermediary. 
This implies that ﬁrm size k of an entrepreneur (b, x) is such that 
φ 
k ≤ b +  π(b + l, x; w).  (11)
1 + r + τ 
We omit the arguments of k and l for readability.  Thus, ﬁrm size is limited by an agent’s inheri­
tance, b, and the capital market frictions, τ and φ. 
3.2  Occupational choice 
The occupational choice of each agent deﬁnes his lifetime income. Deﬁne Ω = [0, ∞) × [x, x]. For 
any w,r > 0, an agent (b, x) will become an entrepreneur if (b, x) ∈ E(w, r), where 
E(w, r) = {(b, x) ∈ Ω : V (b, x; w, r) ≥ w}.  (12) 
The complement of E(w, r) in Ω is Ec(w, r).  If (b, x) ∈ Ec(w, r), then agents are workers.  The 
following lemma characterizes occupational choice for a given bequest and entrepreneurial ability. 
Lemma 1  Deﬁne be(x; w, r) as the curve in set Ω such that V (b, x; w, r) = w.  Then there exists 
an x∗(w, r) such that 
∂be(x;w,r)  < 0 for x > x∗(w, r) and 
∂be(x;w,r)  = −∞ for x = x∗(w, r). ∂x  ∂x 
1.  For all x, if b < be(x; w, r), then (b, x) ∈ Ec(w, r). 
2.  For all x, if b ≥ be(x; w, r), then (b, x) ∈ E(w, r). 
Proof. See lemma 2 of Antunes et al. (2007). 
Figure 1 shows occupational choice in (b, x) space for the baseline economy in section 4. Lemma 
1  and  ﬁgure  1  indicate  that  agents  are  workers  when  the  quality  of  their  project  is  low,  i.e., 
x < x∗(w, r)  (the  lightest  shaded  area).  For  x x∗(w, r)  agents  may  become  entrepreneurs,  ≥
depending on whether or not they are credit constrained.  If bequests are very low, agents are 
workers even though their entrepreneurial ability is higher than x∗(w, r). The negative association 
between be(x; w, r) and x suggests that managers with better managerial ability need a lower level 
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Figure 1:  Occupational choice.

3.3  Consumers 
In period t, the lifetime wealth of an agent characterized by (bt,xt) is given by 
Yt = Y (bt,xt; wt,rt) = max{wt,V (bt,xt; wt,rt)} + (1 + rt)bt.  (13) 
Lifetime wealth is thus a function of agent-speciﬁc bt  and xt, and economy-wide wt  and rt. Given 
lifetime wealth, (13), agents choose consumption and bequests to maximize preferences (1).  This 
problem deﬁnes optimal consumption, ct  = c(Yt), and bequest, zt+1  = b(Yt), policies.  The func­
tional form of (1) implies that agents leave a proportion 1 − γ of their lifetime wealth as a bequest. 
Bequests cannot be negative because every agent can become a worker. 
3.4  Competitive equilibrium 
Let Υt  be the bequest distribution at period t, which evolves endogenously across periods.  The 
initial bequest distribution, Υ0, is exogenously given.  In a competitive equilibrium, agents op­
timally solve their problems and all markets clear.  The agents’ optimal behavior was previously 
described in detail. It remains, therefore, to characterize the market equilibrium conditions.7  Since 
the consumption good is the numeraire we need two market clearing conditions to determine the 
wage rate and the interest rate. The labor and capital market equilibrium equations are: 
n(x; wt,rt)Υt(db)Γ(dx) =  Υt(db)Γ(dx)  (14) 
z∈E(wt,rt)  z∈Ec(wt,rt) 
k(b, x; wt,rt)Υt(db)Γ(dx) =  bΥt(db)Γ(dx).  (15) 
z∈E(wt,rt) 
7See Antunes et al. (2007) for a formal deﬁnition of the competitive equilibrium. 
7 � 
Table 1:  Parameter values, baseline economy.

Parameters  Values  Comment/Observations 
β  0.55  Labor share based on Gollin (2002)

α  0.35  Capital share based on Gollin (2002)

τ  0.005  Intermediation cost based on Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)

γ  0.94  Calibrated to match the U.S. historical Post-War return on government

bonds (about 2%, International Financial Statistics) 
φ  0.26  Calibrated to match the percent of entrepreneurs over the total 
population (about 9%) based on Quadrini (1999) 
�	 4.422  Calibrated to match the entrepreneurial earnings Gini index of 45% 
(see Quadrini (1999)) 
Given that the only connection between periods is the bequest, it is essential to provide the law 
of motion for the distribution of bequests to fully characterize the competitive equilibrium. Deﬁne 
Pt(bt,A) = Pr{zt+1  ∈ A|bt} as a non-stationary transition probability function, which assigns a 
probability for a bequest in t + 1 for the descendant of an agent that has bequest bt.  The law of 
motion of the bequest distribution is 
Υt+1 =  Pt(b, A)Υt(db).	 (16) 
In the quantitative exercises it is important to evaluate policy experiments in “stable” economies, 
where the real wage, interest rate and income distribution do not change signiﬁcantly over time. 
Antunes et al. (2007) show that when policies and institutions are stationary a unique steady-
state equilibrium exists (i.e., an equilibrium with a constant real wage and interest rate, w and 
r, and invariant distribution, H = ΥΓ); from any initial condition the economy converges to this 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 2  There exists a unique stationary equilibrium with w > 0,  r −1 < ∞ and invariant 
distribution Υ.  In addition, for any initial bequest distribution Υ0, interest rate 0 < r − 1 < ∞, 
and stationary credit market frictions (τ, φ), the bequest distribution converges to Υ. 
Proof. See Proposition 2 in Antunes et al. (2007). 
In the calibration and quantitative experiments we study the economy in this particular equi­
librium. Thus, we consider the long run impact of changes in policies and institutions. 
4  Measurement 
In order to study the quantitative eﬀect of ﬁnancial repression and contract enforcement on en­
trepreneurship and economic development, we must assign values to the model parameters and 
specify a functional form for the distribution of managerial ability. Our strategy is to calibrate the 
model economy such that the long run equilibrium matches some key statistics of the U.S. econ­
omy.  We assume that the cumulative distribution of managerial ability is given by Γ(x) = x 
1 
� .  8 
8Chaterjee,  Corbae,  Nakajima  and  R´ ıos-Rull  (2002)  have  shown  that  this  functional  form  can  generate  an 
earnings distribution that is similar to the U.S. distribution. 
8 Table 2: Basic statistics, U.S. and baseline economy. Sources: International Financial Statistics database, 
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Quadrini (1999), Maddison (1995), and World Development Indi­
cators database. 
U.S. economy  Baseline economy 
Yearly real interest rate (%) 
Tax as a percentage of total bank assets (%) 
% of entrepreneurs (%) 
Entrepreneurs’ income Gini (%) 
Capital to output ratio 













When � is equal to one, entrepreneurial talent is uniformly distributed in the population. When � 
is greater than one the talent distribution is concentrated among low talent agents. We deﬁne the 
model period to be 35 years.  Table 1 lists the value of each parameter and includes a comment 
on how each was selected.9  We set α and β such that about 55% of income is paid to labor, 35% 
is paid to the remuneration of capital, and 10% are proﬁts.10  We use tax as a percentage of total 
bank assets to measure intermediation costs, which in the United States is 0.5%.11 
We must determine the value of three remaining parameters: The fraction of total income that 
is left to the next generation, 1 − γ, the strength of ﬁnancial contract enforcement, φ, and the 
curvature of the entrepreneurial ability distribution, �.  We choose these three parameters such 
that in the baseline model the real interest rate is 2%,12 the percent of entrepreneurs over the total 
population is about 9%, and the Gini index of entrepreneurial earnings is about 45%, see Quadrini 
(1999). The calibrated value of γ that matches the historical risk-free rate of return on government 
bonds in the United States is 0.94.  This value suggests that agents in general leave about 6% of 
lifetime wealth as inheritance to the next generation. Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ (2000) estimate that 
bequests account for 4 to 8% of labor compensation. In the steady state of our model the ratio of 
bequests to labor earnings is 
1−γ  = 0.065, which is in the interval estimated by Gokhale  1−(1−γ)(1+r) 
and Kotlikoﬀ (2000). The value of φ in the baseline economy is 0.26. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) 
calibrate an enforcement parameter 1−f that is conceptually identical to φ using a diﬀerent model 
and U.S. data. They ﬁnd that 1 − f = 0.25, which is similar to our calibrated measure. 
The  model  matches  the  U.S.  economy  fairly  well  along  a  number  of  dimensions  that  were 
calibrated (the ﬁrst four statistics in table 2), as well as some statistics that were not calibrated, 
9Appendix A contains sensitivity analysis for each parameter.  The results are robust to all parameters except 
utility parameter γ, which determines bequests. 
10Gollin (2002) argues that it is important to adjust factor income shares by entrepreneurial income, which is often 
treated incorrectly as the capital income share.  If we include entrepreneurial proﬁts as labor income as suggested 
by Gollin, the eﬀective labor and capital income shares will be 0.65 and 0.35, respectively. These income shares are 
those that map our model to those observed in the U.S. national accounts. If we use another adjustment suggested 
by Gollin, which assumes that entrepreneurial income is the same mix of labor and capital income as in the rest of 
the economy, the eﬀective labor and capital income shares will be roughly 0.61 and 0.39, respectively. In any case, 
the eﬀective labor income share will be in the range estimated by Gollin, 0.60 to 0.80. 
11See Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). A model period corresponds to 35 years, thus the target intermedia­
tion cost in our model is τmodel = (1 + 0.005)35 − 1 = 0.1907. 
12We deﬁne the real interest rate by the nominal U.S. T-Bill rate minus the realized inﬂation rate.  The average 
yearly real rate from 1960 to 2000 in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database is 2%.  Since the model 
period is 35 years, the model interest rate is (1 + 0.02)35 − 1 = 1. 
9 Table 3:  Policy Experiments: Intermediation cost. φbase and τbase denote the baseline parameter values. 
Output  Wage,  % of  Credit to  Entrepreneurs’  Interest 
per capita,  % baseline  entrepreneurs  output  income  rate 
% baseline  ratio  Gini 
Part (a): Exogenous interest rate, r. Enforcement parameter, φbase = 0.26 
Baseline  100.00  100.00  8.80  2.02  45.35  1 
τ = 2 × τbase  95.14  95.35  8.94  1.82  45.20  1 
τ = 4 × τbase  85.24  85.90  9.34  1.46  44.83  1 
Part (b): Endogenous interest rate, r. Enforcement parameter, φbase = 0.26 
τ = 2 × τbase  98.06  99.25  8.85  2.01  45.51  0.80 
τ = 4 × τbase  93.70  96.70  9.08  1.98  46.10  0.33 
such as the capital to output ratio and total private credit as a share of output.  According to 
Maddison (1995) the capital to output ratio in the U.S. is roughly 2.5, while in the model it is 
2.24.  Data from the World Bank Development Indicators show that over the last 15 years the 
average total private credit as a share of income in the U.S. was about 1.98, while in the model it 
is 2.02. The model does not match the income Gini: the model income Gini is roughly 33%, while 
in the data it is 40-44%.  However, since every worker receives the same equilibrium wage rate in 
the model economy, it follows that it should underestimate its real world counterpart.13 
5  Quantitative Experiments 
We now explore how the equilibrium properties of the model change with benchmark variations 
in intermediation costs and contract enforcement.  We vary the parameters separately, and then 
run experiments in which we change both simultaneously.  In all cases we examine the model’s 
predictions along six dimensions: output per capita as a fraction of U.S. output per capita, the wage 
rate as a fraction of the baseline value, the percentage of the population that are entrepreneurs, 
private credit as a share of output, the entrepreneurs’ income Gini coeﬃcient, and the interest 
rate. All statistics correspond to the steady-state equilibrium of the model. 
5.1  Intermediation Costs:  τ 
Table 3 describes the model’s predictions as the value of the intermediation cost parameter is 
changed.  A rise in τ  has two eﬀects:  First, entrepreneurs decrease the demand for loans for a 
given interest rate, since the cost of borrowing has increased.  This is the demand eﬀect.  When 
the interest rate is exogenous, this is the only eﬀect on the loan market. The decrease in loan size 
lowers the capital input, and a greater number of small ﬁrms is required to clear the labor market. 
More people choose to become entrepreneurs and self-ﬁnance their projects, but these additional 
projects are generally less productive and smaller because they are run by less able managers with 
smaller bequests.  Second, when the interest rate is endogenous, a fall in the demand for outside 
ﬁnance decreases the interest rate. A lower interest rate implies higher capital, higher productivity 
13We could have added labor income shocks to increase the income Gini.  This would increase the complexity of 
the model without adding any new insights to the results. 
10 Table 4:  Policy Experiments: Enforcement. φbase and τbase denote the baseline parameter values. 
Output  Wage,  % of  Credit to  Entrepreneurs’  Interest 
per capita,  % baseline  entrepreneurs  output  income  rate 
% baseline  ratio  Gini 
Part (a): Exogenous interest rate, r. Intermediation cost parameter, τbase = 0.005 
Baseline  100.00  100.00  8.80  2.02  45.35  1 
φ =  1 
2 × φbase 
φ =  1 
4 × φbase 
φ =  1 
20 × φbase 

























Part (b): Endogenous interest rate, r. Intermediation cost, τbase = 0.005 
φ =  1 
2 × φbase 
φ =  1 
4 × φbase 
φ =  1 
20 × φbase 

























and larger ﬁrm size.  This is the general equilibrium eﬀect.  When the interest rate is endogenous, 
the overall eﬀect on the economy of a rise in τ depends on these two opposing forces. 
Quantitatively, when the interest rate is exogenous and τ is quadrupled relative to the baseline, 
entrepreneurs rise to 9.34%, output per capita falls to 85.24% of the baseline value, and the outside 
credit to output ratio falls from 2.02 to 1.46. When the interest rate is endogenous, there is a sharp 
decrease in r due to the general equilibrium eﬀect. Output per capita falls to 93.70% of its baseline 
value and the change in the credit to output ratio is small, decreasing by only 2% while in the 
exogenous case it decreases by 28%. When r is ﬁxed, all the adjustment is done by the loan quantity, 
as the credit to output ratio shows.  When r is endogenous, the quantity adjustment in the loan 
market is much smaller due to factor price movement.  The diﬀerence in entrepreneurial income 
inequality is also striking. When r is exogenous there are more but less productive entrepreneurs, 
leading to a decrease in income inequality. When r is endogenous, a falling interest rate increases 
the size of projects that can be ﬁnanced, increasing the income of entrepreneurs at the upper tail 
of the income distribution.  However, higher intermediation costs increase the cost of borrowing 
and therefore have a negative impact on the income of credit constrained entrepreneurs, who in 
general are in the lower tail of the income distribution. 
5.2  Investor Protection:  φ 
Table 4 shows that as the level of enforcement decreases (φ  0),  output per capita and the  →
credit to output ratio decrease.  There are more entrepreneurs in the economy, but they are less 
productive.  The eﬀects are again stronger when the interest rate is exogenous than when it is 
endogenous.  Weaker contract enforcement means that the demand for loans will fall for a given 
interest rate;  see equation (9).  Therefore, entrepreneurs decrease working capital and ﬁrm size 
shrinks.  For the labor market to clear, more but less productive entrepreneurs enter.  This is the 
demand eﬀect, and it is the only eﬀect in the economy when the interest rate is exogenous. When 
the interest rate is endogenous, the general equilibrium eﬀect is also operative:  a decrease in the 
demand for borrowing decreases the interest rate, which in turn implies a higher demand for loans. 
Higher ability entrepreneurs can be funded at lower cost, increasing productivity and ﬁrm size. 
11
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Table 5:  Policy Experiments: Intermediation cost & Enforcement. φbase, τbase are baseline parameters. 
Output  Wage,  % of  Credit to  Entrepreneurs’  Interest 
per capita,  % baseline  entrepreneurs  output  income  rate 
% baseline  ratio  Gini 
Part (a): Exogenous interest rate, r. 
Baseline  100.00  100.00  8.80  2.02  45.35 
τ = 2 × τbase, φ =  2
1 × φbase  72.13  69.71  11.05  0.86  45.05  1 
τ = 4 × τbase, φ =  4
1 × φbase  51.36  49.77  13.59  0.21  41.81  1 
Part (b): Endogenous interest rate, r. 
τ = 2 × τbase, φ =  1
2 × φbase,  96.22  98.50  9.84  1.91  48.49  -0.27 
τ = 4 × τbase, φ =  1
4 × φbase  71.51  75.75  11.55  1.88  49.00  -1 
We also investigate two limiting cases, φ =  1  × φbase  (virtually no enforcement) and φ = 1 20 
(perfect enforcement).  When the interest rate is exogenous,  output per capita is roughly 39% 
and 132% of the baseline economy value with virtually no enforcement and perfect enforcement, 
respectively.  Therefore, a typical agent in an economy with full enforcement is about 4.5 times 
richer than a typical agent in an economy with virtually no enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts. 
The diﬀerence in output per capita is much smaller (a factor of about 1.3) when the interest rate 
is endogenous.  We can conclude that although ﬁnancial contract enforcement, φ, can generate 
important variations in output per capita, it alone cannot account for the fact that incomes in the 
richest countries are 30 times higher than in the poorest; see Parente and Prescott (2000). 
5.3  Intermediation Costs and Investor Protection:  τ , φ 
Table 5 reports results of experiments in which both enforcement and intermediation costs are 
changed. When φ and τ both worsen by a factor of four, output per capita decreases by about 49% 
when the interest rate is exogenous and 29% when it is endogenous. This result is consistent with 
our previous ﬁnding that the demand eﬀect is signiﬁcant, but it is oﬀset by factor price movements 
associated with the general equilibrium eﬀect when the interest rate is endogenous.  Our model 
predicts that negative real interest rates can occur when the interest rate is endogenous, a result 
that may seem odd (see the last columns of tables 4 and 5).  This result is consistent with the 
negative interest rates observed in repressed ﬁnancial markets (i.e.,  closed economies with low 
investor protection and high intermediation costs).  Calomiris and Beim (2000) document that 
Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East had real interest rates ranging from -10% to 
0% until the burst of ﬁnancial liberalization in the 1990s. Real interest rates in these regions then 
increased to the level observed in industrialized countries and East Asia. Similarly, the average real 
interest rate in transition countries reached -35% in 1993, and has increased to the level observed 
in industrialized countries.  When ﬁnancial reform decreases the cost of outside ﬁnance, talented 
entrepreneurs are able to start ﬁrms and operate them at higher, more productive scales.  There 
are fewer, but more productive, entrepreneurs. As a result, output and inequality increase. 
12



































































































































































































































































































Figure 2:  Financial repression, legal enforcement, GDP per capita, and private credit to output ratio. 
Net interest margin and intermediary taxes over total assets are from Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999).  De 
juris φ is the Legal Rights Index from The World Bank (2005a) data.  De facto φ is the Legal Rights Index times 
the Rule of Law (see Kaufmann et al. (2003)). GDP per capita and private credit over output are from The World 
Bank (2005b). GDP per capita is in 2002 US$ adjusted for PPP. Countries were selected based on data availability. 
The solid line is the best second order polynomial ﬁt. 
Counterfactual Analysis 
The previous experiments describe quantitative properties of the model for systematic variations 
in ﬁnancial contract enforcement and intermediation costs.  We now use independent estimates 
of intermediation costs and contract enforcement for several representative countries, keeping the 
other parameters at the U.S. level. The purpose of this counterfactual exercise is to investigate what 
the level of U.S. output per worker would be if ﬁnancial contract enforcement and intermediation 
costs were the same as in,  for instance,  Russia.14  This gives an estimate of how much of the 
diﬀerence in output per worker between Russia and the U.S. can be accounted for by diﬀerences 
in ﬁnancial market imperfections.  We discuss Brazil, France, Russia and Singapore in detail, as 
representatives of Latin America, Europe, a transition country and a high growth Asian country. 
In the Appendix,  we report detailed results for Argentina,  Chile,  Germany,  Hong Kong,  Italy, 
South Korea, Poland and the U.K., and in ﬁgures 3 and 4 we summarize results for 25 countries. 
For each country, we feed in independent estimates of intermediation costs and contract en­
forcement and compare the model’s predictions with the relevant country data.  Intermediation 
14We do not assume that the other parameters in Russia are the same as those observed in the U.S. Our goal is 
to isolate the eﬀects of intermediation costs and enforcement.  As our sensitivity analysis shows, the results might 
be diﬀerent if, for instance, the share of bequests over earnings, 1 − γ is very diﬀerent in Russia than in the U.S. 
13
costs are measured as intermediary taxes over banks’ total assets: 1.1% in Brazil, 0.2% in France, 
1.9% in Russia and 0.5% in Singapore.15  Figure 2 shows that the relationship between per capita 
output and either the net interest margin or intermediary taxes is similar.  The relationship be­
tween the credit to output ratio and intermediary taxes is stronger than the net interest margin 
relationship. Because we model τ as a deadweight loss, ﬁgure 2 veriﬁes that intermediary taxes is 
the appropriate measure in our model. Estimates of the contract enforcement parameter are based 
on Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2005) and The World Bank (2005a).  We use two methods to 
assess enforcement parameter φ: a de juris measure based on the written laws of a country and a 
de facto measure to account for how laws are likely to be enforced. Figure 2 shows that these two 
measures are qualitatively similar, but we now consider their quantitative signiﬁcance. 
6.1  De juris  φ 
For the de juris measure we use a legal rights index which indicates the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. This index follows previous work by La Porta et al. (1998), 
and includes seven aspects of collateral law and three aspects of bankruptcy law.16  The index 
ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better 
designed to promote access to credit. To determine the parameter estimate for φ, we multiply the 
ratio of the legal rights index of a country to the U.S. value by the baseline φ = 0.26.  For Brazil, 
the corresponding value is φ = 0.074.  France and Russia have the same value of φ = 0.11, while 
in Singapore the estimated value is φ = 0.37. 
Table 6 shows that when the interest rate is exogenous, contract enforcement and intermediation 
costs alone explain roughly half of the diﬀerence in output per capita between Brazil and the U.S., 
and almost the whole diﬀerence in total private credit as a share of GDP. When the interest rate is 
endogenous, ﬁnancial market imperfections explain only a small part of the diﬀerence in output per 
capita, but a large part of the diﬀerence in the credit to output ratio.  Simulations using Russian 
data yield similar results.  Interestingly, when the interest rate is exogenous, intermediation costs 
and ﬁnancial contract enforcement explain all the diﬀerence in output per capita and the credit to 
output ratio between France and the U.S. 
Singapore is particularly  interesting because measured enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts is 
higher than in the U.S., but output per capita is 32% lower.  When the interest rate is exogenous 
our model indicates that output per worker would be 13% higher in the U.S. if contract enforcement 
were similar to Singapore.  Two alternatives may account for the discrepancy between the model 
predictions and data for Singapore: i) Other factors (e.g., total factor productivity or diﬀerences in 
bequests in Singapore and the U.S., as measured by parameter 1 − γ) may explain why Singapore 
has higher contract enforcement,  but lower output per capita and credit over output than the 
U.S. ii) Creditor protection and total credit (productivity) may not have a monotonic relation as 
assumed in Kehoe and Levine (1993) type models, where borrowers have an incentive to default if 
the punishment is less than the debt repayment obligation. Lenders know this, and rationally limit 
the supply of credit. Higher creditor protection leads to a higher credit supply; there is no default 
15Intermediation costs can also be measured by the net interest margin,  which Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) decompose into its constituent parts:  non-interest income, overhead costs, taxes, loan loss provision, and 
after tax bank proﬁts.  Since τ  is a deadweight loss in our model, and some of these components need not be, we 
use Taxes/Total Assets. Figure 5 in appendix A shows that the net interest margin of country j relative to the net 
interest margin in the U.S. has a strong positive correlation with the intermediary taxes of country j relative to the 
intermediary taxes of the U.S. Quantitative simulations are therefore similar for both cost measures. 
16The index contains data on the duration of time to enforce a contract and costs (court and attorney fees) across 
countries. The legal rights index is: Brazil 2, France and Russia 3, Singapore 10 and U.S. 7. 
14 Table 6:  De juris φ. Empirical Data and Model Predictions for Reference Economies.

φ  τ 
Exogenous  in­
terest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita,  output 
% baseline  ratio 
Endogenous 
interest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita  output 




1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs & enforcement 
France (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs & enforcement 
Russia (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs & enforcement 
Singapore (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 



































100  2.02 
22  0.35 
94.17  1.78 
60.38  0.52 
57.57  0.46 
77  0.86 
103.01  2.12 
70.58  0.79 
72.43  0.84 
23  0.15 
86.31  1.45 
70.58  0.79 
62.04  0.59 
68  1.15 
100  2.02 
113.67  3.02 
113.67  3.02 
100  2.02 
22  0.35 
97.77  2.00 
97.20  1.94 
94.76  1.92 
77  0.86 
97.77  2.03 
97.96  1.95 
99.03  1.96 
23  0.15 
93.89  1.99 
97.96  1.95 
91.57  1.92 
68  1.15 
100  2.02 
101.06  2.05 
101.06  2.05 
in equilibrium, thus increasing the punishment is welfare improving.  In contrast, recent work by 
Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) shows that when some agents default in equilibrium there 
may be an optimum level of creditor protection. Increasing the punishment for default beyond this 
level is not welfare enhancing because borrowers might decrease the demand for outside ﬁnancing, 
decreasing capital and output.17  This is clearly an important issue for future research. 
Figure 3 reports the performance of our model for 25 countries. The ﬁgure shows the predicted 
output per capita (and the credit to output ratio) relative to the U.S. level of relative output per 
capita observed in the data.  If imperfections in the ﬁnancial sector explained all the diﬀerence 
in output per capita between a particular country and the U.S., then the point would lie on the 
450  line. We observe: i) when the interest rate is exogenous, there is a strong positive correlation 
between model predictions and observed data; ii) the model tends to predict values that are higher 
than those observed in the data, but this is not surprising given that we focus on only two capital 
market frictions and abstract from all other diﬀerences among countries (i.e., TFP, labor market 
institutions, government policies, etc.); iii) when the interest rate is endogenous, there is a sharp 
diﬀerence between the predictions of the model and the data for most countries. On (iii), we note 
17For the U.S., recent work by Grant (2003) shows that increasing the punishment for default increases debt held 
as suggested by Kehoe and Levine (1993). However, consumption is smoother in high exemption states. 























































































































































Figure  3:  De  juris  φ.  Data  and  Model  Predictions  for  Selected  Economies.  Gray  squares:  Model 
predictions with exogenous r; solid line is the best second order polynomial ﬁt.  Blue diamonds:  Model 
predictions with endogenous r; solid line is the best second order polynomial ﬁt. Dashed line: 450 line. 
that recent waves of ﬁnancial reforms have occurred in many countries.  Interestingly, for some 
European countries, such as France, Italy and Greece, our model indicates that ﬁnancial frictions 
account for the whole diﬀerence in income levels between these countries and the United States. 
6.2  De facto  φ 
In the previous counterfactual exercises we used a legal rights index as a proxy for investor pro­
tection parameter φ, which measures the degree to which de juris collateral and bankruptcy laws 
facilitate lending.  However, the written law is only part of investors’ legal protection.  Another 
part is the overall quality of the rule of law in the country, as this determines how the written law 
is enforced in practice.  Following Ara´ ujo and Funchal (2005), we now deﬁne investor protection 
by the previous legal rights index times a rule of law indicator.  The rule of law index, which is 
computed by Kaufmann et al. (2003), measures the degree to which laws are enforced in society.18 
According to this index, the U.S. has a score of 5.588 while Brazil has a score of 0.88.19  This mea­
sure of de facto enforcement results in higher variation in investor protection than does the legal 
rights index alone. Investor protection between the U.S. and Brazil now varies by a factor of 6.35, 
18We use the 2002 rule of law index, which varies from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher scores indicate that agents have higher 
conﬁdence in the rules of society. We normalize it to a 0 to 10 interval. 
19The investor protection index for France, Russia and Singapore is 2.298, 1.032, and 8.5, respectively. As before, 
we multiply the ratio of our measure of investor protection for a country to the U.S. value by the value of φ used 
in the benchmark calibration. 























































































































































Figure  4:  De  facto  φ.  Data  and  Model  Predictions  for  Selected  Economies.  Gray  squares:  Model 
predictions with exogenous r; solid line is the best second order polynomial ﬁt.  Blue diamonds:  Model 
predictions with endogenous r; solid line is the best second order polynomial ﬁt. Dashed line: 450 line. 
almost twice the alternative measure.  Interestingly, ﬁgure 4 shows that the correlation between 
the model and the data is even better for the de facto measure. Most countries are closer to the 450 
line. Notice that for an exogenous interest rate, ﬁnancial market imperfections explain almost the 
whole diﬀerence in output per capita for some European countries (France, Italy and Greece), and 
a signiﬁcant part of the gap for some Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) and 
Transition Economies (Russia and Poland).  The pattern for exogenous and endogenous interest 
rates is also similar to ﬁgure 3, for reasons explained previously. 
Table 7 reports quantitative results for the de facto measure of enforcement for the four reference 
countries.  See the Appendix for eight additional countries.  The alternative enforcement measure 
does not change signiﬁcantly for France and Singapore, therefore the quantitative counterfactual 
exercises for these countries are similar to those reported for the de juris  measure.  The results, 
however, are quite diﬀerent for Brazil and Russia, since these countries have a much lower level 
of investor protection when the rule of law is introduced. When investor protection falls from the 
U.S. to the Brazilian level, output per capita falls by 50% and the credit to output ratio falls to 
0.28.  This implies that de facto enforcement alone accounts for roughly 64% of the diﬀerence in 
output per capita between the U.S. and Brazil.  It also accounts for the whole diﬀerence in the 
credit to output ratio.  Results for Russia are quantitatively similar to those observed in Brazil, 
except that in Russia intermediation costs play a larger role than in Brazil. 
17
Table 7:  De facto φ. Data and Model Predictions for Reference Economies.

φ  τ 
Exogenous  in­
terest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita,  output 
% baseline  ratio 
Endogenous 
interest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita  output 




1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs & enforcement 
France (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs & enforcement 
Russia (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs & enforcement 
Singapore (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 



































100  2.02 
22  0.35 
94.17  1.78 
49.22  0.28 
47.57  0.25 
77  0.86 
103.01  2.12 
68.35  0.73 
70.09  0.77 
23  0.15 
86.31  1.45 
51.16  0.32 
46.89  0.24 
68  1.15 
100  2.02 
114.27  3.08 
114.27  3.08 
100  2.02 
22  0.35 
97.77  2.00 
93.79  1.91 
93.50  1.90 
77  0.86 
97.77  2.03 
97.67  1.94 
98.74  1.95 
23  0.15 
93.89  1.99 
96.51  1.90 
87.69  1.89 
68  1.15 
100  2.02 
101.06  2.05 
101.06  2.05 
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��  �� 
7  Constrained Firms 
In our baseline economy about 10% of ﬁrms fully self-ﬁnance and the remainder seek loans at 
some point during the 35 year model period.  This raises the question:  How would our results 
change if entrepreneurs were less credit constrained?  In order to answer this question we use the 
Quadrini (2000) two sector model of production which adds an unconstrained “corporate sector” 
to the constrained entrepreneurial sector.  This provides a robustness check on our results.20  The 
corporate sector has a representative ﬁrm with a standard constant returns-to-scale production 
function:  Kc  and Nc  denote capital and labor, respectively, and Ac  is a total factor productivity 
(TFP) parameter. The corporate ﬁrm’s output of consumption good, Yc, is given by: 
Yct = AcK
θ N
1−θ , θ ∈ (0, 1), Ac > 0.  (17) ct ct 
The representative ﬁrm in the corporate sector takes factor prices (w, r) as given and chooses labor 









(1 + rt) = θAc  .  (19)
Nct 
The only other equations of our original model economy that are modiﬁed by the introduction of 
this corporate sector are the two market clearing conditions (14) and (15) which become: 
n(x; wt,rt)Υt(db)Γ(dx) + Nc(wt,rt) =  Υt(db)Γ(dx)  (20) 
z∈E(wt,rt)  z∈Ec(wt,rt) 
��  �� 
k(b, x; wt,rt)Υt(db)Γ(dx) + Kc(wt,rt) =  bΥt(db)Γ(dx).  (21) 
z∈E(wt,rt) 
We wish to perform quantitative exercises, and must now calibrate two additional parameters: 
the capital share in the corporate technology, θ, and TFP parameter, Ac.  Consistent with Gollin 
(2002), we assume that the capital share in the corporate sector is θ  = 0.40.  We calibrate Ac 
such that 60 percent of aggregate capital is employed in the corporate sector (see Quadrini, 2000), 
giving Ac  = 0.375.  Parameters α, β and τ  are the same as in table 1.  We use the same targets 
to calibrate φ, γ and �, but their values change with the introduction of the corporate sector to:21 
γ = 0.953, φ = 0.086 and � = 5.649.  The new γ and � are close to the baseline values in table 
1, but φ is three times lower than our baseline value of 0.26 and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). 
Table 8 reports key statistics of the U.S. economy and those generated by the calibrated model 
with a corporate  sector.  The model matches well all target  estimates  (lines 1 to 5),  but now 
underestimates the capital to output ratio (1.72 versus 2.5).  The ratio of credit to entrepreneurs 
over output is 0.51; if we also assume that capital in the corporate sector is borrowed, then the 
ratio of private credit to output is higher (1.54). Both values are considerably lower than the U.S. 
economy estimate of 1.98.22 
We  now  conduct  policy  experiments  in  the  corporate  model  identical  to  those  in  table  5: 
ﬁx all other parameters, and analyze benchmark variations in intermediation costs and contract 
20See also Wynne (2005).

21As before, parameters γ, φ and � are calibrated to set the yearly real interest rate in the model to 2 percent, the
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Table 8:  Basic statistics, U.S. and economy with a corporate sector.  Sources:  International Financial 
Statistics database, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Quadrini (1999), Quadrini (2000), Maddison 
(1995), and World Development Indicators database. 
U.S. economy  Baseline economy 
Yearly real interest rate (%) 
Tax as a percentage of total bank assets (%) 
% of entrepreneurs (%) 
Entrepreneurs’ income Gini (%) 
Capital employed in the corporate sector (%) 
Capital to output ratio 















enforcement. Table 9 shows that when the interest rate is exogenously determined the results are 
similar to what we found previously,  but the output eﬀect is stronger.  When the enforcement 
parameter decreases by a factor of 2 and intermediation costs double, output decreases by 61% 
in table 9 but by only 28% in table 5.  The reason for this diﬀerence in magnitude is the absence 
of wage changes in the model with a corporate sector.  An exogenous interest rate implies an 
exogenously determined wage rate – see equations (18) and (19). Therefore, higher credit market 
imperfections imply, for given factor prices, lower demand for loans by each entrepreneur which 
decreases capital input and therefore labor demand.  Previously, lower labor demand implied a 
decrease in the wage rate, which increased labor input and output. Now, the wage rate is constant 
and potential entrepreneurs become workers in the corporate sector.  The fraction of total capital 
used by the corporate sector increases sharply with higher credit market imperfections, but the 
sector is not necessarily more productive than some of the credit constrained entrepreneurs, which 
accounts for the output loss. 
When the interest rate is endogenous, the results are sharply diﬀerent than in the case without 
a corporate sector. Now when the enforcement parameter decreases by a factor of 2 and interme­
diation costs double, output decreases by 50% in table 9; it decreased by only 3.8% in table 5. 
Nonetheless, there is still a sizeable general equilibrium eﬀect on output, as the 50% decrease is 
smaller than in the exogenous interest rate case, 61%. Lower enforcement and/or higher interme­
diation costs imply a lower demand for capital by each entrepreneur and therefore a lower demand 
for labor.  However, for each entrepreneur the policy eﬀects are stronger on capital demand than 
on labor demand.23  Capital and labor are then used by the corporate sector with a higher capital 
labor ratio and the interest rises. The wage rate decreases, counterbalancing some of the negative 
eﬀects on output. In both cases inequality decreases sharply as credit market imperfections worsen. 
There are more workers in this economy receiving the same (low) labor income. 
Table  9  shows  that  adding  a  corporate  sector  deepens  the  eﬀects  on  output  of  the  policy 
experiments  in  table  5.  This  may  seem  surprising  since  the  goal  of  adding  an  unconstrained 
corporate sector was to relax the credit constraint.  Output drops because the share of capital 
number of entrepreneurs over the total population to 9 percent, and the entrepreneurial income Gini to 45 percent. 
22This might seem at odds with, for instance, Quadrini’s (2000) calibration, but in his model a time period is 
one year while in ours a period covers the entire time that agents engage in productive activities (35 years).  The 
introduction of a corporate sector in a yearly model is intuitive since, in any given year, a considerable fraction of 
ﬁrms may not be credit constrained. In a model with longer periods, more ﬁrms are likely to be credit constrained 
at their inception. The diﬀerent timing assumptions might justify diﬀerent perspectives on when a corporate sector 
is appropriate. 
23From equation (4) observe that  ∂n / ∂k  = α/(1 − β), which is less than one as long as α < β, as we assume.  ∂φ  ∂φ 
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Table 9:  Policy Experiments: Intermediation cost & Enforcement. φbase, τbase are baseline parameters 
Output  % of Capital  % of  Credit to  Entrepreneurs’  Interest 
per capita,  employed in the  entrepreneurs  output  income  rate 
% baseline  corporate sector  ratio  Gini 
Part (a): Exogenous interest rate, r: τbase = 0.005, φbase = 0.086, Ac = 0.375 
Baseline  100.00  60  9.01  0.51  45 
τ = 2 × τbase, φ =  1
2 × φbase  38.58  94  7.36  0.10  25.40  1 
τ = 4 × τbase, φ =  4
1 × φbase  26.59  97  6.37  0.03  17.31  1 
Part (b): Endogenous interest rate, r: τbase = 0.005, φbase = 0.086, Ac = 0.375 
τ = 2 × τbase, φ =  1
2 × φbase  49.68  84  8.95  0.11  30.50  1.64 
τ = 4 × τbase, φ =  1
4 × φbase  38.12  89  8.59  0.02  23.82  1.83 
used by the corporate sector increases from 60% to at least 84% (in the endogenous interest rate 
case) when enforcement decreases by a factor of 2 and intermediation costs double.  First, this 
illustrates that it is important to channel capital to the most productive users when agents are 
heterogeneous, not simply relax the percentage of constrained agents. Second, Ayyagari, Beck and 
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt (2003) show that the share of the entrepreneurial sector in total output (based on 
ﬁrms with less than 250 employees) increases with the level of development, but this relationship is 
not as strong as our numerical experiments suggest. For instance, the contribution of the corporate 
sector to total output is roughly similar in Argentina, Peru, Japan, and the United States, despite 
diﬀerences in their levels of economic development.  Just as higher frictions decrease productivity 
in the entrepreneurial sector, TFP may also fall in the corporate sector through a mechanism that 
we do not explicitly model. For instance, low enforcement might aﬀect the ability of large ﬁrms to 
mitigate operational risk, which typically is an increasing function of the ﬁrm scale.24 
8  Concluding remarks and policy implications 
This paper developed a framework to study qualitatively and quantitatively the eﬀects of two 
ﬁnancial frictions, intermediation costs and ﬁnancial contract enforcement, on three measures of 
development: output per capita, total credit and inequality. We used data on intermediation costs 
and enforcement to map observed cross country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial frictions into our model 
economy. We found that: 
•	 Using independent measures of intermediation costs and enforcement, we show that ﬁnancial 
frictions account for part of the diﬀerences in international income levels. Our counterfactual 
exercises using φ de facto show that ﬁnancial market imperfections explain almost the whole 
diﬀerence in output per capita for some European countries (France, Italy and Greece), and 
a signiﬁcant fraction for some Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) and 
transition economies (Russia and Poland). 
24We also did experiments keeping the share of the capital in the corporate sector (Kc/K) constant at 60 percent. 
In this case, the TFP parameter of the corporate sector, Ac, must decrease to keep the share of this sector constant, 
when enforcement decreases and/or intermediation costs increase. In both interest rate cases the results are roughly 
similar to table 5 except the credit to output ratio drops more signiﬁcantly. For the share of capital in the corporate 
sector to be constant, productivity in this sector must decrease. 
21 •	 The quantitative implications of ﬁnancial frictions depend on whether the interest rate is 
endogenous or exogenous, with the eﬀects on output typically more pronounced when the 
interest rate is exogenous. An unconstrained corporate sector tends to exacerbate the impact 
of ﬁnancial frictions on output, because corporate ﬁrms are not necessarily more eﬃcient than 
some of the constrained entrepreneurs. 
We conclude by discussing three related strands of literature.  As noted at the outset,  our 
paper is related to the literature on occupational choice and the dynamics of economic develop­
ment and inequality (e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Lloyd-Ellis 
and Bernhardt (2000), and Lucas (1978)).  We diﬀer from this literature because our goal is not 
to study analytically the path of economic development,  occupational choice or inequality;  we 
investigate quantitatively how ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect these variables in the long run. The second 
literature seeks to explain why some countries are much richer than others. Part of this literature 
uses development accounting to investigate whether observed income disparities across countries 
are explained by factor accumulation or total factor productivity (e.g., Hall and Jones (1999) and 
Prescott (1998)). Another part uses a modiﬁed version of the neoclassical growth model to study 
whether plausible diﬀerences in policy distortions and barriers to the use of better technologies can 
account for diﬀerences in income per worker across countries (e.g., Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) 
and Parente and Prescott (1999)). Our analysis is similar, but focuses on ﬁnancial frictions and two 
important micro-foundations, occupational choice and limited commitment to ﬁnancial contracts. 
We also investigate other dimensions of the data, such as credit as a share of output and inequality. 
Finally, our paper is related to a large literature on ﬁnance, economic growth and develop­
ment (e.g., Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Boyd and Smith (1998) and Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990)).25  We do not study the evolution of ﬁnancial markets over the process of development. 
Instead, we focus on how the reform of exogenous ﬁnancial policies aﬀects the economy.  In this 
respect, Amaral and Quintin (2005), Castro, Clementi and MacDonald (2004), Erosa and Hidalgo-
Cabrillana (2007), Jeong and Townsend (2007), Quintin (2001) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) 
are closest to our work.  Castro et al. (2004) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) derive impor­
tant theoretical results, but do not study the quantitative implications of the model;26  they use 
econometrics to test a number of qualitative results.  Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2007) study 
the quantitative implications of capital market imperfections in the steady-state equilibrium at a 
ﬁxed interest rate (equal to the rate of time preference), but do not consider general equilibrium 
eﬀects. Amaral and Quintin (2005) also consider a ﬁxed interest rate (small open economy). The 
Jeong and Townsend (2007) model is similar to ours, but their quantitative exercises are diﬀerent. 
With Thailand data, they use occupational choice and credit constraints to show that the eﬀects of 
ﬁnancial deepening on TFP depend on factor prices (general equilibrium). Quintin (2001) studies 
a dynamic general equilibrium model which focuses on the link between limited enforcement and 
international diﬀerences in ﬁrm size and Guner et al. (2004) examine a broader set of policies that 
restrict ﬁrm size. Their focus is on international ﬁrm size distributions. 
25There is also an important literature that studies empirically the relationship between ﬁnancial development 
and economic development. See King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), and Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
26In a costly state veriﬁcation model with a credit market imperfection and no choice, Castro et al. (2004) show 
that the eﬀect of investor protection on capital accumulation is not linear. As here, there are two eﬀects: a demand 
eﬀect and a general equilibrium (supply) eﬀect. 
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A  Sensitivity Analysis 
A.1  Deﬁnition of τ 
In the quantitative exercises we use data on intermediary taxes over total assets as a measure of 
intermediation costs.  Instead, we could have used the net interest margin.  Figure 5 shows that 
intermediary taxes in country j relative to intermediary taxes in the U.S. are strongly correlated 
with the net interest margin in country j relative to the net interest margin in the U.S. Thus, the 
results are broadly similar. 
Figure 5:  Net Interest Margin of country j relative to the net interest margin of the U.S. versus interme­
diary taxes of country j relative to intermediary taxes of the U.S. The dashed line is the 450 line. 
A.2  Parameter Sensitivity 
In this section we show how the baseline economy changes with each parameter of the model. We 
evaluate the eﬀects of a deviation of one percent in each parameter from its baseline value on 
output per capita, the wage rate, the percent of entrepreneurs, total private credit as a share of 
output, entrepreneurs’ income inequality and the interest rate.  Table 10 shows that our results 
are robust to all parameters except for the utility parameter γ. Notice that 1 − γ is the fraction of 
income that is left to the next generation. Therefore, a lower γ implies higher savings and therefore 
higher capital and output. 
26 Table 10:  Sensitivity Analysis. Subscript ‘base’ stands for the baseline parameter values.

Output  Wage,  % of  Credit to  Entrepreneurs’  Interest 
per capita,  % baseline  entrepreneurs  output  income  rate 
% baseline  ratio  Gini 
Part (a): Exogenous interest rate, r. 
Baseline  100.00  100.00  8.80  2.02  45.35  1 
γ1 = 1.01 × γbase 
γ2 = 0.99 × γbase 
�1 = 1.01 × �base 
�2 = 0.99 × �base 
α1 = 1.01 × αbase 
α2 = 0.99 × αbase 
β1 = 1.01 × βbase 
β2 = 0.99 × βbase 
98.64  99.25  8.61 
101.55  100.75  8.95 
99.90  99.85  8.72 
100.19  100.15  8.83 
98.83  98.80  8.66 
101.16  101.35  8.91 
102.13  102.55  8.51 
97.96  97.45  9.06 

























γ1 = 1.01 × γbase  92.34  91.31  8.77  1.68  45.23  1.39 
γ2 = 0.99 × γbase  106.88  107.93  8.80  2.35  45.49  0.71 
�1 = 1.01 × �base  99.90  99.85  8.72  2.02  45.50  1 
�2 = 0.99 × �base  100.09  100.15  8.83  2.01  45.19  1 
α1 = 1.01 × αbase  98.93  98.80  8.65  2.02  45.81  1 
α2 = 0.99 × αbase  101.19  101.06  8.91  2.01  44.93  1 
β1 = 1.01 × βbase  102.71  103.44  8.48  2.02  45.85  0.97 
β2 = 0.99 × βbase  97.38  96.85  9.07  2.01  44.89  1.02 
B  Additional Counterfactual Simulations 
Compare tables 9 and 10 to tables 6 and 7. They show that the results for two other Latin American 
countries, Argentina and Chile, are roughly similar to Brazil. For the European countries, Italy is 
similar to France but Germany and the U.K. over predict output and credit.  Transition country 
Poland is similar to Russia.  Finally, high growth Asian countries Hong Kong and S. Korea are 
similar to Singapore (i.e., over predict output and credit). The over predictions of the high growth 
Asian countries, Germany and the U.K. suggest that other factors, which we abstract from, are 
important for explaining the output and credit market gaps between these countries and the U.S. 
(e.g., labor market institutions, government policies, etc.) 
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Table 11:  De juris φ. Empirical Data and Model Predictions for Reference Economies.

φ  τ 
Exogenous  in­
terest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita,  output 
% baseline  ratio 
Endogenous 
interest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita  output 




1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Chile (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Germany (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Hong Kong (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Italy (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Korea, South (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Poland (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
United Kingdom (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 



































































100  2.02 
29  0.19 
101.01  2.05 
70.58  0.79 
68.44  0.73 
27  0.62 
103.88  2.16 
79.80  1.09 
82.62  1.17 
74  1.15 
102.04  2.08 
105.24  2.34 
107.38  2.43 
76  1.58 
102.04  2.08 
113.67  3.02 
115.92  3.14 
74  0.69 
100  2.02 
70.58  0.79 
70.58  0.79 
51  0.85 
103.01  2.12 
94.07  1.69 
96.89  1.78 
31  0.25 
89.22  1.6 
70.58  0.79 
63.78  0.63 
79  1.31 
101.01  2.05 
113.67  3.02 
114.63  3.08 
100  2.02 
29  0.19 
100.38  2.02 
97.96  1.95 
98.06  1.94 
27  0.62 
101.47  2.02 
98.44  1.97 
99.80  1.97 
74  1.15 
100.77  2.02 
100.78  2.02 
101.06  2.03 
76  1.58 
100.77  2.02 
101.06  2.05 
101.74  2.05 
74  0.69 
100  2.02 
97.96  1.95 
97.96  1.95 
51  0.85 
101.06  2.02 
99.51  2.01 
100.58  2.00 
31  0.25 
95.25  2.00 
97.96  1.95 
93.12  1.93 
79  1.31 
100.38  2.02 
101.06  2.05 
101.35  2.05 
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Table 12:  De facto φ. Empirical Data and Model Predictions for Reference Economies

φ  τ 
Exogenous  in­
terest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita,  output 
% baseline  ratio 
Endogenous 
interest rate 
Output per  Credit to 
capita  output 




1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Chile (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Germany (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Hong Kong (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Italy (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Korea, South (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
Poland (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 
3) Intermed. costs and enforcement 
United Kingdom (data) 
Model’s predictions 
1) Intermed. costs 
2) Enforcement 



































































100  2.02 
29  0.19 
101.01  2.05 
52.52  0.34 
52.81  0.35 
27  0.62 
103.88  2.16 
78.15  1.08 
81.07  1.11 
74  1.15 
102.04  2.08 
107.47  2.50 
109.71  2.60 
76  1.58 
102.04  2.08 
111.94  2.88 
114.17  2.97 
74  0.69 
100  2.02 
65.92  0.66 
65.92  0.66 
51  0.85 
103.01  2.12 
88.06  1.41 
90.48  1.49 
31  0.25 
89.22  1.6 
64.56  0.63 
58.73  0.50 
79  1.31 
101.01  2.05 
116.50  3.33 
117.86  3.40 
100  2.02 
29  0.19 
100.38  2.02 
96.61  1.91 
96.70  1.90 
27  0.62 
101.47  2.02 
98.44  1.97 
99.80  1.97 
74  1.15 
100.77  2.02 
100.78  2.03 
101.26  2.03 
76  1.58 
100.77  2.02 
101.06  2.04 
101.74  2.05 
74  0.69 
100  2.02 
97.57  1.94 
97.57  1.94 
51  0.85 
101.06  2.02 
99.03  1.98 
100.09  1.99 
31  0.25 
95.25  2.00 
97.48  1.93 
92.63  1.91 
79  1.31 
100.38  2.02 
101.26  2.06 
101.65  2.06 
29
